2010

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Recommended Citation
Freeman, C. P. (2010). Embracing humanimality: Deconstructing the human/animal dichotomy. In G. Goodale & J. E. Black (Eds.). *Arguments about Animal Ethics* (pp. 11-30). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Chapter Two

Embracing Humanimality

Deconstructing the Human/Animal Dichotomy

Carrie Packwood Freeman

> Crossing borders or the ends of man I come or surrender to the animal—
> to the animal in itself, to the animal in me
> and the animal at uncase with itself . . .
>
> —Jacques Derrida[1]

Most people do not see themselves as animals, considering that term to refer to a wholly different category than humankind—there are minerals, plants, animals, and then there are humans. In almost two decades of advocating for nonhuman animals (NHAs), I have discovered that the hegemonic distinction between human and animal serves as a primary boundary that constrains and impedes an average American's consideration of animal rights as a valid ethical position.[2] A harmonious conversation about animal issues splits at the point where I, as advocate, compare injustice toward NHAs to that toward humans. At this point, speciesism comes into play, and I have lost my audience, as the listeners claim that caring about humans' interests takes priority. This is indicative of the general acceptance of animal *welfare* viewpoints in favor of better treatment of domesticated and "useful" animals as opposed to animal *rights* viewpoints that reject the very practice of domestication and use.[3] Those arguments deployed on behalf of animal rights often lead nowhere absent deconstructing the human/animal dualism that lies at the heart of speciesism.

As a communications scholar, I seek to define which aspects of this deconstruction are most useful for animal rights advocacy. I will argue in this chapter that advocates should prioritize notions of *humanimality*, or in other words, how humans might rhetorically construct themselves as animals. Yet my research on popular vegetarian campaigns of U.S. animal

rights organizations finds that when campaigns focused on humans, it was on their propensity to be *ethical* and *humane* rather than on their animality or their similarity to NHAs. Campaigns more often focused on the sentience and suffering of NHAs, particularly seeking to convince the public that maligned NHA species such as pigs and chickens had similar capabilities to other NHAs who are more well-liked, such as dogs and primates.[4] This welfare emphasis is not an effective rhetorical strategy for transforming discriminatory worldviews about animals as "other."

This reticence for advocates to explicitly construct a sense of humanity's animality (humanimality) is not surprising, as American society is rhetorically constructed on humanist principles that celebrate humanity's specialness and define it in opposition to animality. Thus, in seeking to rhetorically combat speciesism, how can animal advocates talk about humans and other animals in ways that are posthumanist?[5] In answering this question, I draw upon posthumanist scholarship to critically analyze how these humanist tensions not only affect but also exist within animal rights philosophy itself, likely weakening arguments in favor of animal rights. My goal is to improve the logical basis upon which this philosophy informs animal rights advocacy.

I begin by examining how humanist terminology makes it hard to rhetorically avoid speciesism and embrace humanimality. I then analyze the paradoxes involving animal activists' deployment of humanist adjectives like *humane* and *ethical*, as well as tensions over whether animal rights strategies should promote humanity's similarity to other animals or take a new tack toward embracing diversity among all animals. This involves deconstructing not only the human/animal binary but also the related binaries of nature/culture and similarity/diversity to unify these dualistic concepts in strategic ways.

I suggest that animal advocates more humbly represent humans as social animals who are uniquely prone to excess, explaining the biological need for humanity's complex ethical systems (in comparison to other social animals) as opposed to viewing human morality solely as a magnanimous cultural choice. Animal advocates' efforts to promote humans' ethical treatment of NHAs, rather than continuing to primarily craft messages saying "they are like us," should begin to promote the idea that "we are like them" in many ways that are worth acknowledging. However, the challenge in this focus on humanimality and expanded notions of identity is to find a way to respect the diversity represented in the animal world (in groups and individuals) so as to avoid creating new hierarchies or revised notions of "the animal other." I therefore conclude by presenting a blended approach as a solution to better understanding the humanimal/NHA relationship.

THE PROBLEM OF HUMANIST TERMINOLOGY

Inconsistent Definitions of the Term *Animal*

Animal advocates must struggle with using the very central term *animal*. As philosopher Mary Midgley observes, *animal* has two definitions with differing connotations: a "benign" one that includes humans; and a "negative" one that not only excludes humans but also represents what is "unhuman, the anti-human."[6] This links the human/animal and nature/culture dualisms. Similarly, social anthropologist Tim Ingold explains the two opposing conceptualizations of animality as (1) a "domain or kingdom" (which includes humans—a scientific taxonomy that takes into account ecological connections/dependence) and (2) a "condition" (which excludes humans and is "opposed to humanity").[7] In the latter conceptualization, human culture is separated from nature, which is seen as the NHA's domain. This anti-human condition of being an "animal" represents the distinction between "natural" behaviors devoid of values or reasons and the process humans go through to become enculturated and overcome this animality.

Even though humans may understand they are technically part of the animal kingdom, to call a human an *animal* is largely considered an insult. English scholar and animal advocate Joan Dunayer states, "nonhuman animal terms insult humans by invoking a contempt for other species. The very word *animal* conveys opprobrium. *Human*, in contrast, signifies everything worthy."[8] She notes that when someone says "humans *and* animals" they commit a "verbal ruse" denying the benign definition of animal that includes humans in the animal kingdom.[9] The grammatically incorrect yet common phrase "humans and animals" is even used by animal rights campaigns due to a combination of assumptions about the distinction and the connotation of *animal* as an affront to audience members' superior status as humans. Indeed, there is a long history of those in power using NHA labels to belittle human groups for purposes of hierarchizing, marginalizing, and oppressing.[10] Calling a human an *animal* also invokes an implicit belief in the evolution of species that categorizes humans as primates; animal advocates may be unwilling to risk offending religious viewpoints grounded in a humanism that views humans as closer to a divinity than apes, as the evolution versus creationism debate is highly politicized in the United States.

Struggle for Non-Speciesist Terminology

Given the problematic double meaning of the word *animal*, it is challenging to find a non-speciesist term to denote proper respect for NHAs. Other

animals could be called *nonhuman animals* (NHAs), as I choose to do in this essay, or *other-than-human animals*, as both of these labels present the benefit of reminding humans that they too are animals; humanimality is foregrounded every time *nonhuman animal* is invoked. However, these labels still mark them as an "other" in negation to the dominant term *human,* such as *non-white* may imply a racial hierarchy. Activists sometimes refer to NHAs using the term *being*, as in *sentient being* or *living being*, but this still does not carry the weight of *human being* as far as indicating an implicit dignity. Indeed, while the phrase "human dignity" is common, its counterpart, "animal dignity," is rare.

Instead of finding a new term for other animals, humans could redefine themselves by including the word *animal* in their own description, calling themselves *human animals* instead of just *humans* to remind themselves of their mutual status as animals; this may help eliminate the use of the term *animal* as an insult toward humans.[11] Alternately, humans could simply refer to all animals as *persons* and distinguish them, humans included, based on species names when needed. It does, however, seem like some new terms are required to properly denote the new value humans should be placing on what philosopher Jacques Derrida refers to as "the multiplicity of living beings" and animals' status as members of one group.[12] Some might find the term *infra-human* too clinical, so perhaps *humanimal* is the best neologism so far proposed, as it reveals that the term *animal* is literally a part of *human.*[13] Advocates should carefully phrase existing words to increase respectfulness toward other animals and foreground how language has been used to covertly privilege humans. But it also seems the creation of new terms is necessary to circumvent the speciesism inherent in a discourse built to reflect the human/animal dichotomy at the heart of the Western worldview.[14]

Inability to Define Human Borders

In the debate over definitions of *animal,* Derrida prefers to embrace complexity instead of homogeneity, emphasizing that there are many differences that could be characterized as "uncrossable borders" among all animals, even among humans. This diversity cannot be reduced to just one definitive border between humans and all other animals: "There is not one opposition between [man] and [non-man]; there are, between different organizational structures of the living being, many fractures, heterogeneities, differential structures."[15] Archaeologist P. J. Ucko echoes this claim that the borderlines are indistinct, even between mammals and other animals: "Contrary to the normal assumption, the borderline between humans and animals, or more specifically between humans, and birds, fish or invertebrates, is anything but

obvious, clear and immutable."[16] In fact, Derrida states it was very difficult to identify any trait that is uniquely "proper of [man]" or exclusive to humans, "either because some animals also possess such traits, or because [man] does not possess them as surely as [he] claims."[17] This is reminiscent of philosopher Peter Singer's contention that there are some NHAs who possess more so-called human capabilities than certain humans, such as infants or people with cognitive disabilities.[18]

Other scholars have noted this same futile humanistic struggle for humans to find a line they can draw in the sand based on one uniquely human characteristic. Anthropologist Elizabeth Lawrence, for instance, details the many allegedly "human" traits throughout history that failed to be proven exclusively human, such as: making tools, teaching cultural practices, practicing rituals, having unique personalities, being aware of death, building and transforming nature, creating art, practicing altruism, possessing language, and experiencing wonder.[19] While language-use was once considered a hallmark of humanity, Derrida also acknowledges NHA language. He explains how human language is related to that of other animals through the notion of *différance* (the fluidity and interconnectivity of meaning that relates to and relies upon a myriad of other meaningful concepts):

> I am thinking in particular of the mark in general, of the trace, of iterability, of différance. These possibilities or necessities, without which there would be no language, *are themselves not only human.* It is not a question of covering up ruptures and heterogeneities. I would simply contest that they give rise to a single linear, indivisible, oppositional limit, to a binary opposition between the human and the infra-human. And what I am proposing here should allow us to take into account scientific knowledge about the complexity of "animal languages," genetic coding, all forms of marking within which so called human language, as original as it might be, does not allow us to "cut" once and for all where we would in general like to cut.[20]

For Derrida, the trait of language that might represent this border between species is analogous to a cut in the subject, or who can be defined as a subject and not an object. This cut, designating a sense of which subjects' interests and perspectives matter, can be marked wherever humans choose, and he lobbies for the cut to include NHA languages.

But should philosophers keep looking for a place to cut or even continue asking what makes humans different from other animals? Midgley answers "no" by acknowledging we are all complex beings who share many qualities, so searching for one differentiating factor is reductionist and futile.[21] She proposes that philosophers instead ask what the best thing about human life is and answer it according to traits that other animals may also possess. That

concern is important as a start to discursively shifting the scholarly questions and the purpose of constructing these truths so that the answers are productive rather than destructive and enable community as opposed to separation or marginalization. Scholars and advocates should begin to ask how all species are unified and in what ways primary differences can be viewed as strengths.

Defining the Moral Boundary between Species

While there are not distinct divisions separating *all* humans from all other animal species in ways that are morally relevant, philosopher Daniel Elstein contends that the broader categorical concept of *species* is itself a contested and arbitrary social construction.[22] He cites Charles Darwin's belief that *species* was an indefinable category where differences between animals were more a matter of degree than kind. Elstein claims that, although these degrees of difference represent varying gaps between species, there is no clear way to determine how much of a gap is of moral significance.[23] Yet in defining moral significance, Elstein argues that it is a common logical fallacy for people to say that distinctions are based on some physical or biological trait, when it is really *mental* traits that they prioritize. *Physical* traits (such as the ability to mate, DNA similarities, or physical resemblance) do not sufficiently warrant the exploitation or mistreatment of a species, while *mental* traits (such as language use, intelligence, or sentience) form the real basis for why people say species divisions matter morally. In quite a radical idea, Elstein proposes reducing the myriad of animal species down to four different (but not mutually exclusive) "moral species concepts" which are based on an animal's mental ability to (1) plan for the future, (2) experience boredom, (3) suffer pain, and/or (4) feel emotions.[24]

The morally relevant traits specified in animal rights philosophy are broader versions of these mental traits. Consider that Singer claims that sentience is the true moral distinguishing factor, and Tom Regan proposes that beings who are conscious subjects of their lives should be the key concern.[25] These mental traits still necessitate a hierarchy, to some extent, where categories of animals are deemed (by humans) to be sentient and conscious enough to warrant fair treatment as a subject. For example, mammals and birds may qualify while oysters or insects may not. This hierarchy reveals the complications of hegemonic power in the creation of truth.[26] Humans can engage in an ideological struggle to define who counts as morally significant beings, yet it is always humans (and certain groups more than others) who maintain the power to redefine mental traits in ways that could just continue to serve instrumental interests and maintain human privilege. This could even be done under the guise of animal protection, as discourse can continually be constructed and reconstructed to enable a comforting appearance that humans are treating "the other" morally.

Human society especially privileges the mental trait of morality—a "civilized" trait that is generally assumed to be a unique product of human culture rather than other animal societies or nature. The next section explores how animal advocacy rhetoric could fulfill its need to appeal to morality (perhaps including the notion of being "humane" toward other animals) without reinforcing the problematic nature/culture and human/animal divides.

ETHICALITY AND THE NATURE/CULTURE AND HUMAN/ANIMAL BINARIES

Rhetoric and the Misunderstanding of Violence

As the so-called humane species, a paradox exists in the lofty, humanist moral values humans claim to have (and to which animal activists appeal) and the way that "human kindness" is often not reflected in humans' actual relations with other animals. These actions seem largely based on self-interested rather than altruistic values. Dunayer suggests the word *humanity* is both speciesist and unjustified, as it implies that kindness is an inherent part of each human's nature, yet many examples can be given of individual humans failing to show compassion. She also critiqued the common use of the phrase *human kindness*, as if the two words naturally fit together, whereas the term *animal kindness* seems foreign and senseless to the ear.[27]

Because humans have a high opinion of their moral values in comparison to the supposed lack in other species, if they had to bear witness to or admit the harm they actually cause other animals (such as in factory farming), it would propagate cognitive dissonance. Derrida predicts that the "industrial, scientific, technical violence" humans impose on NHAs must and will change, albeit over centuries, because it will become "more and more discredited" and "less and less tolerable" as it becomes visible.[28] Further emphasizing visibility and perceptions, he believes a driving force of this change is that this violence "will not fail to have profound reverberations (conscious and unconscious) on the image humans have of themselves."[29] Thus he asks interviewer Elisabeth Roudinesco, "If you were actually placed every day before the spectacle of this industrial slaughter, what would you do?" Roudinesco replies that she would not eat meat anymore and would live somewhere else, because she prefers not to see it.[30] This answer illustrates a point Derrida makes about humanity's need to avoid acknowledging the violence: "No one can deny seriously, or for very long, that men do all they can in order

to dissimulate this cruelty or to hide it from themselves, in order to organize on a global scale the forgetting or misunderstanding of this violence."[31] This rhetorical denial of daily violence and oppression assumes that humans' collective mistreatment and murder of other species causes guilt; therefore, *visibility* of violence is to be avoided in both images and words, requiring careful framing of the way humans view their interactions with other animals.

The "misunderstanding" of violence is practiced rhetorically through strategic use of the word *murder*. One way humans avoid feeling guilty, according to Dunayer, is to construct the notion that "unjustified killing is murder only if the victim is human." She claims humans "prefer to couch nonhuman exploitation and murder in culinary, recreational, and other nonmoralistic terms."[32] Ecofeminist Carol Adams also acknowledges humans' rhetorical tricks meant to deny oppression and violence in food choices. She argues that terms like *meat* and *veal* create an "absent referent" where the individual NHA victim of oppression as well as the human perpetrator are purposely removed from the concept.[33] But what is the benefit of hiding this abuse if humans seek to truly be "humane?" According to Dunayer, "Speciesism is a lie, and it *requires* a language of lies to survive. Currently, our language denies the harm that humans routinely inflict on other animals; linguistically, both the victims and the perpetrators have disappeared."[34] The answer, then, is that it satisfies a psychological need to believe oneself to be *humane*, and the need for this positive self-perception likely takes privilege over actually doing the hard work of living up to one's morals.

This reveals the complexity of the humanist tension in relation to animal ethics, since these scholars must conceive of humans as *being* a moral species to presume people need to deceive themselves linguistically in order to continue being speciesist, yet paradoxically state humans are *not* inherently moral enough to live up to the term *humane*. As I analyze this circularity, the human claim of morality begins to look as if it might be a façade for arrogance in which language (like the very term *humane*) is used as the veneer. Yet animal ethics and advocacy rely upon the idea that if activists rhetorically challenge people to acknowledge the harm they cause other animals, it *would* activate an innate morality. While people's improved behavior might be enacted primarily for purposes of egoism and self-esteem, the advocacy rhetoric reveals a belief that altruism should also be a motivating factor.

The Paradox of Humane-kind

I argue that the notion of human morality results in a conflict for animal advocacy where the very idea that humans should treat NHAs better may be humanist. In other words, promoting an essentialist and superior view of the human being may privilege humans with a certain ethical status presumably not found in other animals (hence the word *human* as the basis for the word *humane*). Because animal advocates claim that species differences are more of degree than kind, I contend that if they were to be truly morally consistent instead of supporting an implicit paternalism or dominionism toward other animals, they would have to expect all other animals to have ethical standards and responsibilities too (albeit based on the animal's individual capacities and free will and not necessarily a contractarian notion of exact reciprocity). This poses a rhetorical conundrum over how to call for human ethical behavior without eliciting elitist notions of "humanity" in opposition to an implied brute animality. But when it comes to the supposedly humanist moral standards, if society conceives of these principles as deriving from nature and not just human culture, then it logically follows that morality might also naturally apply to many social animal species.

Recent research contends that social species *do* have general expectations for cooperative and moral behavior within their group. Animal ethologist Marc Bekoff and philosopher Jessica Pierce find that humans are not the only animal to develop morality and justice, as other social animals practice fairness, empathy, altruism, and trust in their own ways with varying levels of complexity.[35] These scholars coined the term *animal morality* to describe the pro-social behaviors that they believe are a product of both biological and socio-cultural factors. They describe morality as specific to each species and note that individual animal behavior may vary in how well each chooses to observe these group standards, indicating animals exhibit a sense of free will and are not just guided by instinct.

The claim that humans are not the only moral animal could be left at that. However, I will additionally explore the idea of a "natural" ethic that applies to individuals of most animal species, transcending the notion of morality being limited to the culture of social or "higher" animals and its implication that humans must therefore be the highest and most moral animal due to their choice to privilege cultural rather than natural tendencies. As nature and culture conflate here, I examine human ethics by deconstructing it within the nature/culture dualism.

The Nature versus Culture Debate in Ethics for Humanity

Consider that human ethics generally value the compassionate tendency of humans to protect the weak or innocent, such as children, from predation and exploitation by the strong. This protection from exploitation is the basis of social justice movements, and on the surface it appears to be in opposition to the harshness of a simplistic "survival of the fittest" view of nature.[36]

Yet, humans' ethical prohibition against causing harm is legally limited to harm *in excess* of what is necessary for one's survival (consider self-defense arguments in murder trials or in justifying war). This is a principle in line with what other animals practice in nature that ensures ecological balance. Despite ethical standards, clearly many humans do practice exploitation of the weak, often to excess (consider child pornography, slave labor, factory farming, greenhouse gas emissions, genocide/extinction, etc.). In fact, at the risk of essentializing, I argue that the one relevant trait that does distinguish the human species from most other animal species is its ability to do most things (both good and bad, productive and destructive) to *excess* of what is necessary for survival.

Throughout history, philosophers have acknowledged humans' propensity for excess and have discussed this tendency in both positive and negative terms. For example, Aristotle noted that humans could be the most wicked, cruel, lustful, and gluttonous beings imaginable.[37] Neoplatonist philosopher Porphyry believed animals are sentient, rational beings who "likewise have vices, and are envious; though their bad qualities are not so widely extended as in men: for their vices are of a lighter nature than those of men."[38] English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, too, said that language allows humans to benefit from society and laws, but that humans can also use speech for misdeeds, like lying and teaching bad behavior, so that "[man] errs more widely and dangerously than can other animals." Hobbes posited that humans are also more destructive for unjust reasons than other animals: "So just as swords and guns, the weapons of [men], surpass the weapons of [brute] animals (horns, teeth, and stings), so [man] surpasseth in rapacity and cruelty the wolves, bears, and snakes that are not rapacious unless hungry and not cruel unless provoked, whereas [man] is famished even by future hunger."[39] Implying that there are also natural guidelines outside *human* ethical systems, Michel de Montaigne argued, "animals are much more self-controlled than we are, and keep with greater moderation within the limits that Nature has prescribed."[40]

As humans seek to move beyond natural limits, they create additional choices that lead to excess. German philosopher Johann Herder blamed this on humans' sense of free will: "whilst animals on the whole remain true to the qualities of their kind, man alone has made a goddess of choice in place of necessity."[41] French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau admired humans' free will to resist instinct and choose behaviors, specifically behaviors that lead to self-improvement. But to Rousseau this free will was also the "source of all human misfortunes" which "producing in different ages his discoveries and his errors, his vices and his virtues, makes him at length a tyrant both over himself and over nature."[42] Rhetorician Kenneth Burke described a human as one who is corrupted by his/her pursuit of perfection to ascend in hierarchies and is given to excess in this pursuit; Burke especially noted humans' excessive use of symbols and tools.[43]

Feminist scholar Rosalind Coward argues that humans' excess created hierarchies and social inequalities at an unnatural level, while "in animal societies there's a startling absence of complex accumulation and unequal distribution of resources."[44] The source of humanity's excess can be traced back to the advent of agriculture.[45] The domestication of animals about 11,000 years ago transitioned many human beings to a more sedentary, agricultural way of life. Agricultural surpluses created divisions of wealth. In order to protect this wealth, patriarchal warrior cultures developed, creating oppressive systems of control such as slavery and imperialism. While forager societies often viewed other animals with wonder, respect, and partnership (not that some of these societies did not cause extinction or suffering), herder/agrarian societies were more likely to disempower animals in order to control and demystify them. Thus, many societies came to view domesticated animals as commodities and wild animals as competition and pests.

If humans are characterized by excess, which can lead to both comfort and poverty, charity and harm, then an ethical system becomes socially and ecologically necessary for purposes of restraint. Western philosophers have often lauded humans' ability to think abstractly, because it leads to free will, which leads to the ability to control and choose behaviors. Control was implied to be a positive ability to demonstrate restraint in the face of both the "sins" of excess choice in a human society and a supposed animal instinct born from nature.[46] Ancient Western philosophers valued temperance and restraint as ethical virtues, including restraint in food choices.[47] Yet, while humans have the ability to individually show restraint in the face of choice, some claim humans, as a whole, excessively decrease choice in environmentally problematic ways. Modern environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott calls humans "devolutionizers" for the mass extinctions they cause, and food writer Michael Pollan claims that humans are "homogenizers" who use science to simplify natural complexity, such as with monoculture crops that decrease natural diversity.[48]

Environmental philosophers often credit human ethics to biology and evolution, arguing that ethical behavior is natural, and what is natural is, therefore, good. Aldo Leopold conceives of ethics as biological, where there is naturally a "limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence."[49] Callicott believes this was influenced by Darwin's evolutionary theories of humans as social animals that need to create kinship. He contends that ethics would have preceded reason in humans' evolutionary process, because humans needed to have complex linguistic skills that came from being social, and being social requires some limitations on individual freedoms. Darwin,

as well as philosophers David Hume and Adam Smith, all thought that ethics rested on feelings and sentiments, which were found in the animal kingdom.[50] Darwin said that natural selection privileges those individuals with feelings, as they would be more likely to produce offspring who behave in socially acceptable ways. This echoes sociobiological theories that cooperation is more natural than competition among highly social animals, such as humans.[51] Thus Callicott argues that nature is not immoral, as "intelligent moral behavior is natural behavior."[52] Philosopher Holmes Rolston also argues for a *natural* ethic where right is determined by an ability to sustain life rather than just sustaining pleasure.[53] He argues the is/ought principle, usually seen as specious, can make sense in nature because as humans use science or experience to describe how nature functions and explore nature's intricate relationships and harmony, they discover that what *is* often or frequently is what *ought* to be. It is, then, hard to know where facts end and values begin.

I contend that because the human practice of exploiting or harming other animals *to excess* goes against harmonious or ecological principles often found in nature, that humans' ethical system of promoting compassion and protective justice *is* actually largely based on "natural" principles: both the principle of *cooperation* to garner social support and the principle of *moderation* for ecological balance. I believe our fundamental ethical principles are, or should be, based on the idea of taking only what we need for our basic survival, complementing the principles of deep ecology, with any excess acts of harm constituting exploitation and a breach of ethics.[54]

Ultimately, this moderation is what most other animals (not just social animals) already practice, making all animals equally subject to these same ethical guidelines; this notion of equality avoids the humanist tendency to imply that humans should be kind to other animals because humans are ethically superior beings. So I argue that while humans can admit that their ethical system may be highly complex and impressive when compared to that of other animals, this high level of sophistication appears to be necessary to restrain humanity's special propensity for excessive harm. Therefore, when advocates promote animal rights on ethical grounds, they should avoid the word "humane" and take care not to insinuate that all ethical principles are limited to the realm of humanity or that the human animal is more advanced. Perpetuating a construction of the human species as "humane-kind" might unintentionally reinforce the problematic human/animal dualism and related notions of human superiority that lead to not only discrimination against NHAs but also condescending notions of paternalistic stewardship.

One tension in the conclusion above is that it might imply that animal rights should be garnered by emphasizing the *likeness* between human and nonhuman animal traits, in this case a capacity for ethical behavior. Applied more broadly, if one admits that humans or other animal species might generally exhibit more "positive" traits (as in a morally relevant mental trait) than other animals, does that imply some animals are more worthy of rights or fair treatment than others who are different, particularly disadvantaging those who are less like humans? The next section will explore this concern that the likeness model, popular in social justice rhetoric, is ultimately humanist and therefore self-defeating in combating speciesism.

DILEMMAS OVER WHETHER ANIMAL RIGHTS STRATEGIES SHOULD PROMOTE SIMILARITY OR DIVERSITY

Contradictions between Animal Rights and Humanism in Promoting Similarity

Inconsistencies associated with humanism and animal advocacy rhetoric cause some posthumanist scholars to critique the philosophical basis of animal rights, while they remain sympathetic to the need to end modern institutionalized violence toward NHAs. Critical theorist William J. T. Mitchell advises posthumanists to study humanism as essential to a critique of speciesism: "'Speciesism' is ritually invoked in the denigration of others as animals while evoking a prejudice that is so deep and 'natural' that we can scarcely imagine human life without it. The very idea of speciesism, then, requires some conception of 'the posthuman,' an idea that makes sense, obviously, only in its dialectical relation with the long and unfinished reflection on species being that goes by name of humanism."[55] An analysis of humanism fits with the contention that a focus on humanimality and an interrogation of human hegemony—and not just the mistreatment of the animal "other"—should become central to animal activism.

But in considering animal rights philosophy, Derrida contends that animal rights is a flawed concept so long as it models itself after a juridical concept of human rights, as the notion of human rights is based on a humanist "post-Cartesian human subjectivity" that has led to the very oppression that animal activists seek to end. Derrida writes: "Consequently, to confer or to recognize rights for 'animals' is a surreptitious or implicit way of confirming a certain interpretation of the human subject, which itself will have been the very lever of the worst violence carried out against nonhuman living beings."[56] He claims that rights are so conflated with humanism that they cannot serve as the basis for ending NHA exploitation. This is why, even as critical as he is of industrialized exploitation, he writes about animal rights from the perspective of an outsider: "I have sympathy (and I insist on that word) for those who revolt: against the war declared on so many animals."[57] In merely expressing

"sympathy" for activists' desires to challenge violence, he clarifies his doubts about the efficacy of activist communication strategies that rely upon an implicit humanism and a legal notion of rights.

The theories posed by the most prominent animal ethics philosophers, Singer and Regan, could be considered humanist in their focus on how NHAs are similar to humans.[58] Taking this stance, Cary Wolfe notes the irony that animal rights' anthropocentrism ends up "effacing the very difference of the animal other that it sought to respect."[59] It is true that the tensions between the priorities of similarity and difference are essential to the paradox present within animal rights. Thus feminist scholars Lynda Birke and Luciana Parisi find that, "The tension between our similarity and our difference from other animals, moreover, informs much of the political and philosophical tension around debates on animal rights."[60] To clarify a misconception, Ingold states it is not anthropocentric to show how a particular human trait, even a positive one, is unique to the human species, as every species is also likely to have something unique about it. It *is* anthropocentric, however, to compare nonhumans to humans and expect NHAs to have the same capacities before respect is granted, which is something that some animal ethics philosophers do.[61]

This anthropocentrism is especially explicit in animal ethicist Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer's *Great Ape Project*, in which they propose that nonhuman primates serve as a bridge species who deserve to have their rights recognized before other animal species because of apes' similarities to humans.[62] But on a broader scale, even the suggestion that there are few, or no, traits that humans possess that are not also possessed by at least some other animal species is also anthropocentric, albeit more implicitly.[63]

However, before chastising animal rights philosophers and activists for implicitly promoting humanism, one might determine whether the activists' line of argumentation is based more on the desire to *build nonhumans up* in the "noble" likeness of humanity (expanding humanity to include other animals) or based more on the desire to *knock humans down* off their self-constructed pedestal, encouraging them to embrace, instead of shun, their innate animality (expanding animality to include humans). The issue is really a matter of directionality, and I argue the distinction between the two approaches is key. The latter approach of encouraging humans to embrace their animality is less humanist and therefore more morally tenable to posthumanist scholars. But, strategically, it is less commonly used, presumably for the utilitarian reason that it more directly challenges current ideologies about human supremacy and comes across as more threatening to the status and esteem of the very humans who must be convinced. While advocacy that focuses on humanimality might have more philosophical veracity, I recognize that on the level of media sound bite in a commercially dominated public sphere, it may fail to resonate with the American public in meaningful ways, and thus takes more rhetorical skill to construct.

Embracing Human Animality

In thinking long-term, if animal activists fail to convince humans to respect their animality instead of despise it, humans may never treat other animals with appropriate respect. Philosopher Giorgio Agamben notes that humanity is currently based on how much humans control the animal within themselves, as Western metaphysics defines humanity in opposition to animality.[64] This relates to a politics of excluding someone who must still simultaneously be included. The animal is held in an ambiguous space that is both external and internal, where he/she is subject to exile and death without remorse.

Consider the human practice of eating the bodies of other animals. Philosopher David Wood surmises it is less about sustenance than it is about humans' need to demonstrate control, control not only over other animals but more importantly over the animal within themselves.[65] Legal scholar Lee Hall theorizes that meat-eating reveals insecurity, resulting in humans' need to demonstrate power over nature and maintain an image of themselves as predators and not as vulnerable prey.[66] To overcome this fear-based suppression of our animality, the human practice of needless killing of NHAs must be defined as murder (as it would with unjustified killing of humans) or else the animal will always be "the other" instead of ourselves.

Rather than just averring that humanimality is personal to viewing oneself as an animal, it can also be social in terms of viewing one's species as part of the Earth's animal collective. Philosopher Gary Steiner proposes that humans be conceived as members of a greater planetary *community* in which they have moral obligations toward all other sentient beings as fellow kin, regardless of those beings' rational ability to reciprocate or advocate in a human justice system.[67] Steiner describes the predominant rights-based animal protection approach as too reliant on liberal, rationalist rhetoric grounded in anthropocentrism, leading activists to stretch the truth of NHA capabilities for rationality. Thus Steiner critiques the similarity model when deployed in individualistic terms. Instead, he highlights the broader notion of *kinship*, saying "what is lacking is the underlying sense of dwelling alongside animals in a cosmic whole which transcends us and within which we must struggle to find our proper place," which supports a more humble and holistic view of humans as fellow animals.[68]

Another approach to privileging humanimality is through recognizing that wisdom (a valued mental trait) can be obtained via the body by all animals in ways that are not limited to a human-centered rationality reliant on a limited,

linguistic or phonetic notion of language. David Abram, an environmental phenomenologist, suggests deconstructing the mind/body dualism that parallels the human/animal and subject/object dualisms by privileging the *body* as a source of communicative knowledge.[69] Abram encourages humans to begin to reaffirm their bodies and physical senses as a communicative site of gaining wisdom about the entire natural world instead of just relying on human symbolic communication and limiting knowledge to anthropocentric realms. By embracing the "primitive" sensual communication most humans have lost, they would expand their knowledge by beginning to relearn and value what other species are communicating.[70] If the body were not viewed as separate from, and inferior to, the mind, then humans would not use the supposed superiority of the human mind's ability to abstractly reason as an excuse to reduce other life to mere bodies devoid of wisdom. In this view, the body, even that of NHAs, should be enlivened as a subject rather than enervated by being reduced to an object.

Abram's view is useful for redefining intelligence in a non-anthropocentric sense and associating it with all animals, thereby increasing humans' appreciation for the wisdom that can be gained from "reading" the world in ways more common to NHA or "primitive" culture than industrialized human culture. This could also restrain activists from claiming that NHAs are "voiceless," encouraging an acknowledgment that NHA communication is silenced in one sense and often unheard or misinterpreted in another. To recognize the NHA voice, activists should attempt to include NHA communication in advocacy campaigns.

Asking humans to begin to respect the body's wisdom and to embrace their animality is perhaps a philosophically rigorous approach to promoting animal rights, but it is not as pragmatic as the humanist approach of simply proving that many NHAs are similar to humans. The latter recognizes that because people place a high value on supposedly human traits (such as intelligence, kindness, emotional sensitivity, symbolic communication, education, artistic talent, and spirituality), it is only reasonable that animal activists appeal to the fact that NHAs also *share* some of these traits when trying to convince humans to have higher respect for NHAs.[71] Therefore, Derrida's and Wolfe's suggestion that animal rights philosophies should be less humanist and should avoid this human rights or "likeness" model of social justice is unsettling and challenging to conventional activist wisdom about achieving social progress for oppressed groups.

Promoting Difference and Diversity

A philosophical problem with the tactic of emphasizing that NHAs share many valued "human" traits is that it runs the risk of reducing other animals to lesser categories of "sub-humans." Wolfe explains that different species

cannot be expected to possess "qualities, potentials, or abilities that are realized to their *fullest* in human beings."[72] This could leave NHAs forever stuck in the role of diminished or immature humans, just as humans would always be a diminished version of cats, chimpanzees, birds, fish, or any other species, and just as women were once considered diminished forms of men.[73] Activists and philosophers may also find it counterproductive to insinuate that NHAs are close to being humans but are just *under-developed.* Dunayer posits that, from an evolutionary perspective, species should not be ranked as more or less "primitive" against the benchmark of humans serving as the "advanced" species. She clarifies, "species don't evolve toward greater *humanness,* but toward greater *adaptiveness* in their ecological niche," which is reflected in the fact that Darwin did not believe in ranking species as higher or lower.[74]

The case against promoting similarities (whether it be by expanding humanity or animality in either direction) leads to the somewhat counterintuitive argument of promoting *differences* in order to gain equality for other animals. On the surface this flies in the face of reason, since their differences from humans have been highlighted as an excuse to discriminate against them. However, toward this goal, an acknowledgment of difference does not have to equate with an admission of inferiority.[75] While other species are different, they are by no means failed or lesser versions of humans. In exploring the idea of embracing differences, it is useful to acknowledge that the advanced stages of some human social justice movements in the United States have also moved in this direction, as they now promote diversity. The problem that the earlier human rights approach had in gaining equality by emphasizing the similarities between human groups (i.e. men and women, whites and blacks, or heterosexuals and homosexuals) was that the historically oppressed groups were then forced to assimilate into the dominant group's world and live by the standards set by white, Western, heterosexual males. Just as many activists in the civil rights movement do not advocate for complete colorblindness, under the premise that it would wipe out some distinguishing and valued cultural traits and generally disrespects difference, so too the animal rights movement should not expect people to be blind to the many splendid cultural and biological variances among animals. Animal activists should ask people to respect these differences. Diversity in both human society and the natural world is not limited to groups or species but applies to *individuals* within groups/species as well, or else it promotes reductionist biological essentialism.[76]

CONCLUSION: BLENDING SIMILARITY AND DIVERSITY

Ultimately, I propose the best position to these dilemmas is a blended one that embraces both the fundamental commonalities that provide kinship in

a broad sense and the specific differences that provide diversity in an individual sense. While people may come to value NHAs and respect diversity, the concern is that they will still prioritize fellow humans over other animal species if they do not see some similarity that connects all animals and gives them a reason to value other species just as they value their own species. Consider Steiner's suggestion that "we must learn to identify with animals, to see ourselves in them and them in ourselves, in order to appreciate their plight and their prospects" as part of his proposal for conceptually expanding humanity's moral community and identity to include other animals as kin.[77]

As a shared trait, or what Burke called a "consubstantial" unifying trait that creates mutual identity, I suggest that Regan's idea of being a conscious "subject of a life" may be the best option; subjective consciousness is broad enough to include many animal species yet still allow for diversity within and among species.[78] It could be compared to the consubstantial trait of *personhood* that has allowed for equality among races, genders, and ethnicities, while still allowing for diversity. Singer's notion of sentience is quite similar and could also work, as long as the focus expands beyond concerns over bodily suffering and emphasizes individual *life* and personhood. Perhaps if animal rights campaigns encouraged people to embrace diversity and their own animality it would mitigate some of the problematic humanism inherent in building on a human rights model.

The ideas of critical theorists Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari seem to support this notion of blending human-animal relations, as they argue that animals serve to rupture notions of identity and sameness.[79] In their article "Becoming Animal," they use the Nietzschean idea of "becoming over being" to emphasize animal-becoming as a way to free humanity from its humanistic straightjacket. Deleuze and Guattari privilege notions of expansion, multiplicity, mutuality, heterogeneity, and rhizomes over straitjackets like classification, identification, essentialism, and linear progression. Becoming is considered "real," as it contains difference and acknowledges how everything is implicated in everything else. Similarly, zoologist and philosopher Donna Haraway prefers to see humans as "becoming with" animals: "I am who I become with companion species, who and which make a mess out of categories in the making of kin and kind."[80] This complicates traditional notions of identity by saying it is something determined primarily by our *relations with* other animals.

The ideas of these scholars pose an even larger rhetorical test than do my previous discussions of combating speciesism, as they challenge *how* we think rather than *what* we think. Instead of just asking people to incorporate the animal other into a new and expanded identity of fellow conscious beings, as I have in this chapter, this scholarship asks people to understand

themselves outside a defining notion of "self." Rather they should understand themselves more openly via their dynamic relationships with all beings. Hopefully, scholars undertake the challenge to demonstrate how notions of "becoming over being" might inform a radically different and truly posthumanist advocacy rhetoric. Overall, there is great value in advocates undertaking the challenge of embracing the deconstructive principles of diversity, difference, and complexity. But to avoid total relativism, their rhetoric must maintain some sense of unity and kinship that respects ethical standards based on overarching principles, like avoiding unnecessary harm and valuing sentience. This encourages humanities scholars (and/or activists) to admit that natural tendencies and ecological principles have some merit and that there is a "humanity" in what was once thought to be a separate realm of nature.

Rather than primarily talking about NHAs, animal advocates must rhetorically problematize the fragile borders of humanity and species through deconstruction of speciesist language so that humanimals begin to feel pride in their animality. This requires transformation of language to reconstruct new identities, because humanimals will likely experience instability from the deconstruction of deep-seated binaries that once provided familiar and stable boundaries. Therefore, to put the humanimal at ease with itself, advocates and scholars must construct the posthuman in ways that blend the retention of moral integrity and rights with the introduction of a humbler and more integrated place among fellow beings who all must live sustainably within nature's ethic.

11. Patricia Malesh, "Sharing Our Recipes: Vegan Conversion Narratives as Social Praxis," in *Active Voices: Composing A Rhetoric of Social Movements*, ed. Sharon McKenzie Stevens and Patricia Malesh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009): 131–48.

12. Carrie Packwood Freeman, "This Little Piggy Went to Press: The American News Media's Construction of Animals in Agriculture," *The Communication Review* 12, no. 1 (2009): 78–103; and Carrie Packwood Freeman and Debra Merskin, "Having It His Way: The Construction of Masculinity in Fast-Food TV Advertising," in *Essays on Eating and Culture*, ed. Lawrence C. Rubin (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008): 277–93.

13. Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, 41, 43.

14. Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L. Sills (New York: Free Press, 1968): 445.

15. Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, *Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric* (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1985), 182.

16. Edward Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric* (2nd ed.; Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 49, 227; and Randy Allen Harris, *Rhetoric and Incommensurability* (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press 2005), 8–9.

17. Aristotle, *The History of Animals*, trans. Richard Cresswell (London: George Bell, 1897), 250; Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, trans. W. Ogle (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882), 54, 185, fn. 5 and 188, fn. 14; and Aristotle, *On the Parts of Animals*, trans. A. L. Peck (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1955), 201–203.

18. Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 38 (April 1952): 184–188.

19. For instance, a debate about social movement study involving essays by Michael Calvin McGee, David Zarefsky, Stephen E. Lucas, James R. Andrews, and Charles J. Stewart was published in *Central States Speech Journal* 31 (Winter 1980). The forum ranged from the functionality of a modernist/sociological approach to the study of movement leaders, internal strategies, external strategies, and organizational structure to the efficacy and need of a theory altogether.

20. Christine Oravec, "John Muir, Yosemite, and the Sublime Response: A Study in the Rhetoric of Preservationism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 67 (1981): 245–258.

21. See Jonathan Lange, "Refusal to Compromise: The Case Study of Earth First!," *Western Journal of Communication* 54 (1990): 473–494; M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Jacqueline S. Palmer, *Ecospeak: Rhetoric and Environmental Politics* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992); Tarla Rai Peterson, *Sharing the Earth: The Rhetoric of Sustainable Development* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992); Phaedra Pezzullo, "Performing Critical Interruptions: Stories, Rhetorical Invention, and the Environmental Justice Movement," *Western Journal of Communication* 65 (2001): 1–25; and DeLuca, *Image Politics*. Bear in mind that there have been scores of essays and books since.

22. Raymie E. McKerrow, "Critical Rhetoric: Theory and *Praxis*," *Communication Monographs* 56 (1989): 91–111.

CHAPTER TWO

1. Jacques Derrida, "The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow)," trans. David Willis, *Critical Inquiry*, 28 (2002): 372.

2. I choose to use the term *nonhuman animal* (NHA) instead of the more common term *animal* as a way to avoid the implication that "animal" is a separate category in which humans do not belong. Therefore, when I just say *animal(s)*, it includes humans too. This is part of my attempt to embrace humanimality (a sense of human's innate animality). I acknowledge the limitations of the term NHA later in this chapter.

3. I define "animal rights" as an anti-exploitation movement for the abolition of animal slavery. Since the goal is liberation, I could use the term "animal liberation" to describe the movement. However, I choose to employ "animal rights," because it is the label by which the movement is more commonly known. For distinctions between animal welfare and rights ideologies, see Gary Francione, *Rain without Thunder* (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1996), 1–20.

4. Carrie P. Freeman, "Struggling for Ideological Integrity in the Social Movement Framing Process: How U.S. Animal Rights Organizations Frame Values and Ethical Ideology in Food Advocacy Communication." PhD Diss., University of Oregon, 2008. Abstract in *Dissertation Abstracts International*, publ. nr. AAT 3325661 (2008), iv–v.

5. I define "posthuman" as a way of thinking that envisions the human as an animal in a larger ecological community where humans no longer privilege their own species as a wholly separate and superior category and begin to include themselves as one among other animated subjects. Posthumanism incorporates the human rights goals of humanism and blends them with concerns for animal rights and environmentalism. For more information see Cary Wolfe, "posthumanities," http://www.carywolfe.com/post.html.

6. Mary Midgley, "Beasts, Brutes and Monsters," in *What is an Animal?* ed. Tim Ingold (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 35.

7. Tim Ingold, "Introduction," in *What is an Animal?* ed. Tim Ingold (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 4.

8. Joan Dunayer, *Animal Equality: Language and Liberation* (Derwood, MD: Ryce Publishing, 2001), 2.

9. Dunayer, *Animal Equality*, 11.

10. See Carol Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory* (New York: Continuum, 1990); and Marjorie Spiegel, *The Dreaded Comparison: Human & Animal Slavery* (New York: Mirror Books, 1996).

11. But *human animal* is awkward and inconsistent in the sense that we do not refer to other specific species by adding the term *animal* to their name (i.e., we do not say *dog animals*).

12. Jacques Derrida, *For What Tomorrow: A Dialogue (Cultural Memory in the Present)*, trans. Jeff Fort (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 63.

13. The term "infra-human" is used by Derrida and Wolfe; William J. T. Mitchell also used the term "humanimal" in the foreword to Wolfe's book. See William J. T. Mitchell, "The Rights of Things" in *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory*, by Cary Wolfe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), xiii; and Jacques Derrida, "Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject," in *Points . . . Interviews, 1974–1994, Jacques Derrida*, ed. Elisabeth Weber, trans. Peter Conner and Avital Ronell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 255–287.

14. Consider how the women's movement has combated the patriarchy inherent to terms like *mankind* or *chairman*. See Cheris Kramarae and Paula A. Treichler, *A Feminist Dictionary* (Boston: Pandora Press, 1985), s.v. "Chairman," "Mankind."

15. Derrida, *For What Tomorrow*, 66.

16. P. J. Ucko, "Foreword," in *What is an Animal?* ed. Tim Ingold (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), ix-xvi.

17. Derrida, *For What Tomorrow*, 66.

18. Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* (2nd ed.; London: Random House, 1990), 18.

19. Elizabeth A. Lawrence, "Cultural Perceptions of Differences Between People and Animals: A Key to Understanding Human-Animal Relationships," *Journal of American Culture* 18 (1995): 75–82.

20. Derrida, "Eating Well," 284–5.

21. Mary Midgley, "The Lure of the Simple Distinction," in *Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology*, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul Barry Clarke (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 48–50.

22. Daniel Elstein, "Species as a Social Construction: Is Species Morally Relevant?" *Animal Liberation Philosophy & Policy Journal* 1 (2003): 1–19.

23. Elstein, "Species as a Social Construction," 1.

24. Elstein, "Species as a Social Construction," 16.

25. Singer, *Animal Liberation*, 1–23; Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 185.

26. See Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* (Harvester: Brighton, 1980).

27. Dunayer, *Animal Equality*, 11.

28. Derrida, *For What Tomorrow*, 64.

29. Derrida, *For What Tomorrow*, 64.

30. Derrida, *For What Tomorrow*, 71.

31. Derrida, "The Animal that Therefore I Am," 394.

32. Dunayer, *Animal Equality*, 4.

33. Adams, *Sexual Politics of Meat*, 42.

34. Dunayer, *Animal Equality*, ix.

35. Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce, *Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 1–23. The authors provide examples about cooperation, empathy, and justice, such as an African elephant who rescues a trapped group of antelope and rats who refuse to administer shocks to other rats, eschewing the food rewards.

36. This is a term coined by Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Biology* (1864; Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 444.

37. Aristotle, "Animals are Not Political," in *Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology*, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul B. Clarke (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 7.

38. Porphyry, "On the Eating of Flesh," in *Ethical Vegetarianism: From Pythagoras to Peter Singer*, ed. Kerry S. Walters and Lisa Portmess (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), 39.

39. Thomas Hobbes, "Animals Have No Language," in *Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology*, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul B. Clarke (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 19.

40. Michel de Montaigne, "Exclusion from Friendship is Not Rational," in *Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology*, eds. Andrew Linzey and Paul B. Clarke (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 106.

41. Johann G. Herder, "Organic Difference," in *Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology*, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul B. Clarke (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 35.

42. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Freedom of the Will," in *Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology*, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul B. Clarke (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 33.

43. Cited in Foss, Foss, and Trapp, *Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric*, 207.

44. Rosalind Coward, "Dominion is Social," in *Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology*, ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul B. Clarke (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 96.

45. Jim Mason, *An Unnatural Order: Why We Are Destroying the Animals and Each Other* (New York: Continuum, 1997), 118–157.

46. See previous references to Montaigne, Herder, and Rousseau in Linzey and Clarke, *Animal Rights*.

47. Peter Singer and Jim Mason, *The Ethics of What We Eat: Why our Food Choices Matter* (Emmaus, PA: Rodale, 2006), 3.

48. J. Baird Callicott, "The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic," in *Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology*, ed. M. E. Zimmerman (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 110–134; and Michael Pollan, *The Omnivore's Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 214 (original term credited to Wes Jackson).

49. Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in *The Environmental Ethics and Policy Book*, ed. Donald Van de Veer and Christine Pierce (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), 215.

50. See Callicott, "The Land Ethic," 110–134.

51. See Matt Ridley, *The Origins of Virtue* (London: Viking, 1996); and Peter Kropotkin, "Nature Teaches Mutual Aid," in *Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology* (1939), ed. Andrew Linzey and Paul Barry Clarke (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 88–90.

52. Callicott, "The Land Ethic," 129.

53. Holmes Rolston, "Challenges in Environmental Ethics," in *Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology*, ed. M. E. Zimmerman (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 135–157.

54. See Bill Devall and George Sessions, *Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered* (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985).

55. Mitchell, "The Rights of Things," xiv.

56. Derrida, *For What Tomorrow*, 64, 65.

57. Derrida, *For What Tomorrow*, 67.

58. See Singer, *Animal Liberation*; and Regan, *Case for Animal Rights.*

59. Wolfe, *Animal Rites*, 8.

60. Lynda Birke and Luciana Parisi, "Animals Becoming," in *Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology, and Animal Life*, ed. H. Peter Steeves (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), 57.

61. See Introduction in Ingold, *What is an Animal?* 1–15; and Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams, "Introduction," in *The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics*, ed. Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 1–20.

62. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, "A Declaration on Great Apes," in *The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity*, ed. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 1–7.

63. See Stephen R. L. Clark, "Is Humanity a Natural Kind?" in *What is an Animal?* ed. Ingold, 17–34; and refer back to previous citations of Derrida, *For What Tomorrow*, 66; and Lawrence, "Cultural Perceptions," 75–82.

64. Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal*, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).

65. David Wood, "Thinking with Cats (A Response to Derrida)," in *Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity*, ed. Matthew Calarco and Peter Atterton (New York: Continuum, 2004), 128–144.

66. Lee Hall, *Capers in the Churchyard: Animal Rights Activism in the Age of Terror* (Darien, CT: Nectar Bat Press, 2006), 89.

67. Gary Steiner, *Animals and the Moral Community: Mental Life, Moral Status, and Kinship* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), ix–xii.

68. Steiner, *Animals and the Moral Community*, 125.

69. See David Abram, *The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-than-Human World* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 78–79.

70. See Mary Trachsel, "How to Do Things Without Words: Whisperers as Rustic Authorities on Interspecies Dialogue," in this volume.

71. See Jonathan Balcombe, *Pleasurable Kingdom: Animals and the Nature of Feeling Good* (New York: Palgrave, 2006); Roger Fouts, *Next of Kin: My Conversations with Chimpanzees* (New York: Avon Books, 1997); Tim Friend, *Animal Talk: Breaking the Codes of Animal Language* (New York: Free Press, 2004); Jeffrey M. Masson and Susan McCarthy, *When Elephants Weep: The Emotional Lives of Animals* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1995); George Page, *Inside the Animal Mind: A Groundbreaking Exploration of Animal Intelligence* (New York: Doubleday, 1999); and Bekoff and Pierce, *Wild Justice.*

72. Wolfe, *Animal Rites*, 53.

73. Thomas Laquer, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 149.

74. Dunayer, *Animal Equality*, 13.

75. Ingold, *What is an Animal?* 10.

76. See Stephen R. L. Clark, "Apes and the Idea of Kindred," in *The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity*, ed. Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 113–125.

77. Steiner, *Animals and the Moral Community*, 137.

78. Foss, Foss, and Trapp, *Perspectives on Rhetoric*, 192.

79. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, "Becoming Animal," in *Animal Philosophy: Ethics and Identity*, ed. Matt Calarco and Peter Atterton (New York: Continuum, 2004), 87–100.

80. Donna J. Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 19.

CHAPTER THREE

Acknowledgments. I wish to acknowledge the University of Iowa's generous support for this project in the form of a Career Development Award from the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and a faculty fellowship with the Obermann Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Iowa's Research Park.

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3. Daniel Dennett, *Kinds of Minds* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 139.

4. Dennett, *Kinds of Minds*, 23.

5. Daniel Dennett, "Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why," in *Brain Children: Essays on Designing Minds* (Boston: MIT Press, 1998) 339.

6. Stephen Anderson, *Dr. Doolittle's Delusion: Animals and the Uniqueness of Human Language* (New Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).

7. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, "Hiawatha's Childhood" in *The Song of Hiawatha*, http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/modeng/modengL.browse.html.

8. Josephine Donovan, "Caring to Dialogue," in *The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics*, ed. Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams (New York: Columbia, 2007), 360–369.

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10. Watts, "Voice," 192.

11. Michael J. Hyde, *The Call of Conscience: Heidegger and Levinas, Rhetoric and the Euthanasia Debate* (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 2001), 94.

12. Donovan, "Caring to Dialogue," 362.